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PANEL DISCUSSION: EUROPE 1992*
ERIC STEIN:
I have been given the honor of moderating the discussion of this
distinguished panel representing three decades of the European alumni
of the Michigan Law School and four discrete legal career areas. The
credit for organizing the panel goes to my colleague Professor Joseph
Weiler. I shall limit myself to a few more or less frivolous introduc-
tory remarks concerning the Single European Act which forms the
central legal underpinning for the project "Europe 1992."
Your diplomats and politicians have presented us with a bizarre
creature: in front it is a treaty among the twelve member states
amending the three constituent Community treaties, and the tail is a
treaty among the so-called High Contracting Parties, legalizing a se-
cret, incestuous operation among diplomats.
In a more serious vein, there are at least two ways to look at this
conundrum: as the pathetic debris from the ambitious Spinelli draft
treaty for a European Union approved by the European Parliament -
or, one may take a more benign view and look at the Act as a clever,
logical next step according to Jean Monnet's recipe for progressive in-
tegration: fix specific, albeit limited, goals with definite deadlines
which everyone agrees are necessary, and add only such institutional
modifications that everyone agrees are indispensable to achieve these
goals. In due course this will lead to another inherently untenable
situation which will again force a step in the right direction.
I shall now call on our first panelist, Professor Jochen A. Frowein.
Professor Frowein, M.C.L. 1958, has had a distinguished academic
career in Germany; he returned to Michigan as a visiting professor
and Cooley lecturer, and is presently Director of the Max-Planck In-
stitute for Comparative Public and International law in Heidelberg,
Federal Republic of Germany, and Vice-President of the European
Commission of Human Rights. As the first speaker, he shall present
the broadest perspective of the impact of the 1992 project, that is, its
impact on the European constitutional structure.
This panel discussion was organized in conjunction with a two-day reunion of the
European alumni of the University of Michigan Law School. The panel took place in Villa
Schifanoia San Domenico Li Fiezole, (Florence), Italy, on May 19, 1989.
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1992 AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
JOCHEN A. FROWEIN
1. Europe Has a Constitution
a) The constitutional nature of the basic treaties constituting the
European Community has always been stressed by Eric Stein. In
many important research projects he has compared the system estab-
lished by the European Community with the constitutional structure
of the United States.'
The economic freedoms enshrined in the Community have created
a zone of constitutionally-protected economic liberty. This is of
course not a laissez-faire system, but rather a system modeled along
the lines of neo-liberal economic theory which became so prominent
after the second world war.2
The Single Act has added to the constitutional dimension of the
EEC-system. The system of cooperation with the Parliament can be
seen as a first step towards democratic legitimacy within the EEC.3
b) The European Convention on Human Rights has set up a sys-
tem through which common standards for the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms are being developed within the wider
system of the Council of Europe. The impact of the case-law by the
Commission and Court can be seen increasingly as a second pillar of
European integration.4 Although formally separated, there are many
informal links between the two systems of integration.
2. Europe Has No Constitution
a) Although the success story of the European Community cannot
be doubted, Europe still has no coherent system for reacting in a re-
1. 2 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS (T. Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 1982).
2. See E.J. MESTMACKER, EUROPAISCHES WET-rBEWERBSRECHT 13-16 (1974).
3. The problem of democratic legitimacy has been one of the key issues for the Community
system since 1969-70. See Commission of the European Communities, Report of the Working
Party Examining the Problem of the Enlargement of the Powers of the European Parliament:
Report Vedel, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY, Supp. 4/72 (1972); Herzog, Zur Legitimation der Wil-
lensbildung in den Gemeinschaften, in 22 DIE INSTITUTIONELLE ENTWICKLUNG DER
EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN IN DEN SIEBZIGER JAHREN, K6LNER SCHRIFTEN ZUM
EUROPARECHT 35 (1973); Sautter, Legitimation der Willensbildung in den Europaischen Gemein-
schaften und politische Tradition in Frankreich, in 22 DIE INSTITUTIONELLE ENTWICKLUNG
DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN, supra, at 47; Sasse, Die institutionelle Fortenwicklung
der Gemeinshaften, in 22 DIE INSTITUTIONELLE ENTWICKLUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEIN-
SCHAFTEN, supra, at 61; Frowein, Zur institutionellen Fortenwicklung der Gemeinshaft, in 22
DIE INSTITUTIONELLE ENTWICKLUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN, supra, at 83.
4. Frowein, European Integration through Fundamental Rights, 18 MICH. J. L. REFORM 5-27
(1984).
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sponsible manner to European challenges. There is fragmentation in
many areas and a European consensus cannot, or can only with great
difficulties, be found. 5
b) There is still no European foreign policy. The development of
the European Political Cooperation ("EPC") from a communiqu6-
based informal structure into a treaty system represents considerable
progress. However, foreign policy is still mainly directed by national
interests and by national policy makers. 6
c) There is no European currency and there are no European fiscal
powers, although there is considerable debate about the need for a
common currency and a united reserve system. The present structure
is certainly far from appropriate.7
d) There is no constitutional consensus on how Europe should be
covered geographically. It is unclear whether Austria could join the
EC-system; Switzerland will most likely stay apart from it.8 The de-
velopments within Eastern Europe may become of great importance
for the European constitutional structures.
3. 1992 - New Trends and Tendencies
a) There are clear tendencies towards a more perfect union with
constitutional underpinnings. The internal market in itself may only
be seen as the perfection of the original aims which could not be fully
implemented. However, the complete abolition of border controls will
have an effect on security cooperation in the widest sense. 9 The new
activities by the Commission in the area of broadcasting and television
show how far the EEC may affect the cultural structure in member
states. 10
b) There are also clear counter-tendencies. The EEC activities in
the area of culture have met with very strong opposition from all the
German States (Lander) regardless of their political orientation. It is
5. The defense issue probably will again become crucial in this context.
6. See Stein & Henkin, Towards a European Foreign Policy?, in I INTEGRATION THROUGH
LAW 3 (Cappelletti, Seccombe & Weiler eds. 1986); Frowein, Die vertragliche Grundlage der
Europadischen Politischen Zusammenarbeit (EPZ) in der Einheitlichen Europaischen Akte, in Du
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION 247 (1987).
7. Der Delors-Bericht vom April 1989, 44 EUROPA ARCHIV D283 (1989).
8. Austria has formally submitted its application to become a member in July 1989.
9. The implementation of the Schengen Agreement between France, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Benelux countries concerning border controls has run into difficulties because
of the need for a system of police cooperation.
10. The proposal for a Directive is before the European Parliament.
11. Very typical in this context is the article by a Bavarian Minister *of State, Edmund
Stoiber, Auswirkungen der Entwicklung Europas zur Rechtsgemeinschaft auf die Linder der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 42 EUROPA ARCHIV 543 (1987).
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rather alarming that the Federal Statute giving consent to the Single
European Act has created a right for the Federal Council, which is
composed of the representatives of the States, to issue findings con-
trary to the Federal Government in the area of integration. 12
Although an escape clause for cases where urgent needs of foreign pol-
icy or integration policy can be claimed by the Federal Government
was accepted, the idea that the Federal Council can formally bind the
Federal Government is not in line with the constitutional structure
and shows a strong counter-tendency against integration.
Another important counter-tendency develops from the model of
the "European House." Although Gorbachev may not have great in-
fluence on European integration, the developments in Poland and
Hungary certainly do. The possibility that we could have liberal de-
mocracies with a mixed Marxist economy in Eastern Europe could
change European constitutional structures considerably. The German
question cannot be separated from that possibility. It may be that this
counter-tendency against integration will become more important in
the near future.' 3
4. Prospects
Where can one see prospects? Will the European Parliament's in-
fluence over European politics grow? This does not seem to be clear as
yet. The elections for the European Parliament, which will be held
next month (in June, 1989) may again be disappointing in many
respects. 14
However, there is no other way than to create a European consen-
sus except through a parliamentary process. The governmental struc-
tures alone are certainly not sufficient. We will see whether the
activity concerning the new Declaration on Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms of the European Parliament will contribute to that
development.' 5
"Europe" already belongs to the constitutional structure of all the
12. According to article 2 of this law, the Federal Council must give advice (Stellungnahme),
and its advice is binding on the Federal Government except for compelling foreign policy or
integration policy reasons.
13. The creation of the European Community is one of the great achievements of the period
when East-West tensions in Europe were high. It is only natural that a new perspective would
arise if free systems would be established in Eastern Europe. Specific methods of association of
these countries with the EC could then become realistic options.
14. They were disappointing because no European decision could be deduced from the result.
This will remain the situation as long as there are no real issues on which parties will compete for
the European elections.
15. European Parliament Resolution adopting Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms, 32 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 120) 51 (1989).
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member states of the Community, and to a lesser extent to those be-
longing to the system of the European Convention on Human
Rights. ' 6 This is a success which, in spite of all problems raised here,
should not be forgotten. National courts apply European law; na-
tional civil servants meet their colleagues within the Brussels or Stras-
bourg system, national decision makers have to take the European
constitutional framework into account wherever they discuss policy
decisions.
It is with great satisfaction that we celebrate here the work of Eric
Stein who has accompanied the development of a constitutional frame-
work for a federal-type structure in Europe from the very beginning.
E. STEIN:
Thank you, Jochen, for your thoughtful comment. Our next
speaker is Jacques J.H.J. Bourgeois, who was trained first in Belgium.
He attended Michigan in 1959-60 and later returned as a Visiting Pro-
fessor. Thereafter, Jacques has embarked on a most successful career
at the Commission of the European Communities, first as an attorney
in the Legal Services of the Commission, then in an executive position
dealing with financial affairs, only to return to the Legal Services as
the Principal Legal Adviser concerned first with foreign affairs of the
Community and now with its competition policy. He is also a profes-
sor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, and author of a
number of articles on Community Law. He will tell us what "Europe
1992" will mean for non-members of the European Community, the
so-called "third countries" such as the United States.
MARKET ACCESS FOR NoN-EC GOODS
AND BUSINESSES AFTER 1992
JACQUES BOURGEOIS
The question that I would like to address is a fairly simple one. It
has been very much in the minds of businessmen, lawyers, and policy
makers outside the European Community: will the EC's internal mar-
ket, when it is completely realized by January 1, 1993, entail for busi-
ness and people outside that internal market more disadvantages than
benefits? In other words, as the press has coined it, will the EC turn
itself into a "fortress Europe?" Edwin Vermulst will deal with the
16. Frowein, Die rechtliche Bedeutung des Verfassungsprinzips der parlamentarischen
Demokratie fuir den europaischen Integrationsproze 3, 18 EUROPARECHT 301, 315-17 (1983);
Frowein, The European Community and the Requirement of a Republican Form of Government,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1311, 1321 (1984) (Festschrift in Honor of Eric Stein).
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possible implications of the internal market for trade policy. I would
like to touch briefly on two points: market access for goods and mar-
ket access for businesses. They are related to, but different from, trade
policy proper. To put matters in perspective, it may be useful to start
with a more general comment.
What is happening in the European Community is not just twelve
countries building up a customs union. What is emerging is what, for
lack of better words, could be called a pre-federation or a confedera-
tion, with some sort of government of the union to which these twelve
states have granted powers. This results from, and in, what one could
call a constitution. In legal terms this is, of course, not new. Jochen
Frowein has pointed out that it was there from the very beginning.
European integration has, however, acquired a new momentum that
makes politically feasible what was already legally possible. This new
momentum results from, and is expressed in, the amendments to the
European Community's constitution called the Single European Act
(but "what's in a name?") and a political program "Europe 1992."
While it is giving rise to enthusiasm throughout the European Com-
munity ("Europessimism" and "Eurosclierosis" are completely
"d6passes"), in third countries it is giving rise to concerns. What these
third countries overlook in legal debates about Europe '92 is that the
European Community is not a mere customs union. Such an oversight
is understandable since it sometimes tends to be overlooked by certain
governments in the European Community as well. It implies from a
legal point of view, to put it simply, that this entity, relying on the
powers that have been transferred to it, is working out and conducting
external economic policies that are replacing the external economic
policies of the Member States; to that extent the European Commu-
nity's external economic policies are to be considered in the same way
as the external economic policies of, say, Australia, Canada, or the
United States of America.
The Australian, Canadian, and U.S. external economic policies
cannot be seen as a set of agreements between the provinces and the
states that constitute these federations. Likewise, in European Com-
munity constitutional law terms, the European Community's common
external policies cannot be seen as a set of agreements among its Mem-
ber States. In international relations this is, of course, fully accepted
when Canada, Australia and the United States are concerned. I sub-
mit that when dealing with the European Community - even the
USSR has now realized that it can no longer be avoided - other states
are bound to treat it as an entity. This has certain implications be-
cause how the European Community regulates matters in its domestic
[Vol. 11:525
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sphere is then no less relevant for other states as how Australia, Can-
ada, and the United States regulate matters in their domestic sphere.
One of the implications is that, for matters taken over by the European
Community, an international obligation not to discriminate is trans-
ferred from the Member States to the European Community. This
means concretely, e.g., that a possible Most Favored Nation ("MFN")
obligation of France to extend its treatment for tax purposes of Ger-
man companies to other foreign companies becomes an MFN obliga-
tion of the European Community and acquires another dimension: the
obligation of the European Community to extend the treatment for tax
purposes of Swiss companies in the European Community to other
foreign companies. The treatment of German companies in France
becomes irrelevant, in the same way as the treatment for tax purposes
of a New York company in Florida is irrelevant for the U.S.'s MFN
obligations with respect to a French company. This principle is widely
accepted in the trade field under the customs union exception of article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. I submit that
it is also valid in other fields, in particular where states establish forms
of economic integration that are more ambitious than mere customs
unions.
Access for Goods
My first comments concern the access to the EC market for goods,
or, to put it another way, the right to sell goods. Will the right to sell
goods throughout the European Community be different if the goods
originate outside the European Community? Articles 9 and 10 of the
EEC Treaty establish the principle that once goods originating in a
foreign country have been put into free circulation in one European
Community Member State, those goods are assimilated to European
Community goods for the purposes of free circulation in intra-Com-
munity trade. It means that a U.S. product entering the European
Community via, say, Rotterdam, and paying the usual customs duties,
is thus in free circulation in the Netherlands and benefits from the
same rights to move throughout the European Community as a prod-
uct originating in the Netherlands. According to the text of the EEC
Treaty, no customs, duties nor charges having equivalent effect, and
no quantitative restrictions, nor measures having equivalent effect,
may be applied to that U.S. product in intra-Community trade.
An interesting question has arisen: to what extent is the assimila-
tion of foreign products also valid for other Treaty rules?
One could think that this is an* esoteric legal issue, typical of the
EC, providing evidence that the EC is less than a perfect customs
Winter 1990]
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union. It is not. It was in 1976, not in 1878, that, in Michelin Tires
Corporation v. Wages, 17 the United States Supreme Court found itself
still dealing with the question whether a state could lawfully impose a
discriminatory tax on tires originating in Canada and imported into
the United States through another state. If such issues still arise in a
mature federation such as the United States, it is not surprising that
they would arise from the establishment of the EC's internal market.
In light of the concerns of third countries, the relevant question is how
Community law deals with the broader issue of market access of for-
eign products. Two brief remarks may be useful in indicating at least
the general approach.
The first remark relates to taxation of foreign goods. The Court of
Justice has quite recently broadened the assimilation of foreign prod-
ucts entering the Community to genuine Community products with
respect to discriminatory sales taxes. In Cooperative Co-Frutta 18 the
question was whether Italy could lawfully levy a consumption tax on
Columbian bananas that had entered one Member State, Italy, after
having been imported previously to another Member State. Having
found that the Italian consumption tax was not a charge having an
effect equivalent to a customs duty (in which case it would have been
prohibited under the clear wording of EEC article 13junctis articles 9
and 10), the Court held that it constituted internal taxation within the
meaning of article 95 of the EEC Treaty. It then went on to say that,
under that article, Member States cannot remain free to charge dis-
criminatory taxes on products originating in a third country that are
in free circulation in the European Community. The Court rested this
interpretation of article 95 not only on "the spirit of the Treaty ex-
pressed in articles 9 and 10 and ... the system of the Treaty,"' 19 but
also on the ground that "[c]ommercial policy with regard to non-
member countries falls within the exclusive competence of the Com-
munity. ' ' 20 This is interestingly reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme
Court's reasoning in Michelin Tires.
The second remark relates to the impact of intra-Community trade
rules on market access of foreign goods. As interpreted by the Court,
the prohibition of Member States' measures having an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions in intra-Community trade (EEC
article 30) refers to "[a]ll trading rules enacted by Member States
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or po-
17. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
18. Cooperative Co-Frutta v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 1987 E.C.R 2085.
19. Id. at 2112.
20. Id. at 2112.
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tentially, intra-Community trade. ' 21 Even when taking account of the
exceptions of article 36 and other EEC Treaty provisions, along with
the rule of reason in Dassonville and a series of subsequent judgments,
article 30 has become a sort of EC interstate commerce clause with
far-reaching implications. The question has arisen whether this prohi-
bition has the same scope or effect or whether it applies to all matters
where third-country goods in intra-Community trade are concerned,
once they have been put in free circulation in one of the EC Member
States.
There is no doubt that the assimilation of such third-country goods
to goods originating in the EC applies where more or less classical
measures of equivalent effect would be applied by a Member State,
e.g., as in the case of Ireland imposing an import licensing system on
potatoes originating in Cyprus but in free circulation in the United
Kingdom.22 Whether this is also the case under the extensive interpre-
tation of the EC interstate commerce clause is unclear. Some doubts
are possible in light of earlier opinions of the Court. In the EMI/CBS
cases, 23 dealing with Member States' trade-mark legislation, the Court
seems to have distinguished between, on the one hand, products bear-
ing a mark applied in a third country, put into free circulation in a
Member State and, on the other hand, products bearing a trade mark
applied in a Member State. Two views are possible.
According to one view, the prohibition of measures having
equivalent effect in intra-Community trade should not apply equally to
goods originating in third countries and goods originating in the EC.
This is particularly the case under the Cassis de Dijon doctrine, which
provides that a product lawfully produced and marketed in one Mem-
ber State must be accepted by another Member State even when it
does not meet the requirements of the latter Member State's legisla-
tion, unless that legislation amounts to "mandatory requirements re-
lating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions
and the defence of the consumer."' 24 This doctrine is a product of the
EC's constitution, is based on the underlying solidarity between Mem-
ber States, and is justified by the automatic reciprocity which is inher-
ent to the EC's constitution. The Federal Republic of Germany is
bound to accept Cassis de Dijon lawfully manufactured in France ac-
cording to French quality rules, simply because the Federal Republic
21. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R 837.
22. Commission v. Ireland, 1985 E.C.R. 1761.
23. EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., 1976 E.C.R. 811.
24. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Braantwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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of Germany can expect and claim that its products, lawfully produced
and marketed in Germany, will likewise be accepted by France under
the conditions of the Cassis de Dijon25 doctrine.
The other view relies on the text of articles 9 and 10 of the EEC
Treaty and holds that products originating in third countries that have
paid the price to enter the EC market, i.e., the customs duty, have to
be assimilated to EC goods. If they are lawfully marketed in the
Member state of importation, which implies that they meet the quality
rules of that Member State, there is no objective reason to deny them
the benefit of the Cassis de Dijon doctrine. Surprisingly, this issue has
not yet arisen in Court proceedings. The Commission has yet to take a
position on it.
If the second view prevails, the decisive factor may well be the
removal of internal frontiers by December 31, 1992, rather than the
interests of foreign manufacturers and the increase in competition. In
that event, the establishment of a genuine EC internal market will not
be to the sole benefit of EC business and people. Foreign manufactur-
ers will have the opportunity to produce for, and to sell in, that market
under the same rules as EC manufacturers. In order to have access to
the EC's internal market, foreign manufacturers will, of course, still
have to clear the EC's border and will be subject to the EC's external
trade policy measures, just as EC manufacturers exporting to foreign
markets.
Establishment and Services
My second comment concerns access to the EC's internal market
with respect to establishment and services. It is prompted by the con-
cerns voiced in particular by the U.S. Government and American
business about the EC Commission's February 1988 proposal for a
second piece of legislation on banking and financial services. 26 It
should be recalled that pursuant to one of the provisions of the EEC
Treaty 27 a subsidiary of a non-EC company is to be treated as any EC
company when it wants to establish a subsidiary in another Member
state, provided that the first subsidiary is incorporated in a Member
State and has its registered office, its principal place of business, or its
central administration there. The same rule applies when such a sub-
25. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Braantwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
26. Proposal for a Second Council Directive on the coordination of laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions
amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 84) 1 (1988).
27. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 58, opened for signature
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 15. '
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sidiary of a non-EC company wants to provide services in another
Member State. 28 In other words, once a subsidiary of a Swiss bank is
incorporated in France and has its registered office, its principal place
of business or its central administration in France, it enjoys, under
article 58 of the EEC Treaty, the same treatment as a French bank for
the purposes of providing services in Germany or for the purposes of
establishing another subsidiary in Germany. The other Member State
may not subject the provision of services or the establishment of a
second subsidiary to any additional condition on the ground that the
first subsidiary is foreign owned. This interpretation of article 58 by
the EC Commission was contested in the early days by France.
France took the view that article 58 applies only to "genuine" EC
subsidiaries: in other words, subsidiaries that are wholly owned by
non-EC shareholders or that are managed entirely by non-EC citizens
do not come within the scope of article 58, and a Member State, say,
France, is not bound to treat such subsidiaries which are established,
say, in the Federal Republic of Germany, as German companies. The
EC Commission even started court proceedings against France over
the French regime on direct foreign investment, 29 which was inconsis-
tent with article 58 as interpreted by the EC Commission. The pro-
ceedings were dropped in view of certain amendments to the French
regime. It will not surprise anybody in this room that this particular
issue of Community law was analyzed already in 1968 by the Michi-
gan Law Review. 30
It was against this background that the Commission put forward,
in February 1988, a proposal for a second directive, the so-called Sec-
ond Banking Directive, to provide common rules on the establishment
of financial institutions and the provision of financial services. These
common rules are designed to harmonize the rules of operation so that
the right of, say, a German financial institution to establish a subsidi-
ary, say, in France, and its right to provide services in France, could
be fully exercised. On that occasion, the question arose, again,
whether the opening of the market should benefit third-country banks
in the same fashion as it would benefit EC banks. The Commission
maintained its position and its interpretation of article 58: article 58
entitles a subsidiary of a foreign bank, once incorporated in one Mem-
ber State, under one of the conditions of article 58, to have access to
the entire EC market under the conditions of the draft directive as any
28. Id. art. 66.
29. Commission v. French Republic, case 66/69, dismissed. 4 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES,
No. 5, at 117 (1971).
30. Torem & Craig, Control of Foreign Investment in France, 66 MICH. L. REV. 669 (1968).
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EC bank would have, subject to authorization by the Member State of
the first establishment, which would be granted only if Community
banks enjoy reciprocal treatment in the country of the parent com-
pany. In other words, if, say, the Chemical Bank of New York wants
to establish a subsidiary in an EC Member State it would have to ob-
tain an authorization from that EC Member state and the authoriza-
tion would be subject to reciprocal treatment for Community banks in
the United States.
This proposal got a mixed reception in EC Member States. Some
Member States thought it was bad policy and branded it as an at-
tempted exercise in protectionism. The irony is that these Member
States, when acting on their own, follow precisely the same policy. To
them what would be bad policy for the European Community is good
policy when pursued on a national level.
In the United States, following an initial reaction of rejection came
a second, more sophisticated reaction. What did the EC Commission
mean by "reciprocity?" Did it imply that a New York bank would not
be authorized to establish a subsidiary in the UK, unless a German
bank were given the right to establish a subsidiary in New York and,
moreover, unless that New York subsidiary were as free to operate in
Florida and California as the New York bank's London subsidiary
would be in Germany or Italy? The United States authorities pointed
out that granting the same treatment in the U.S. as the treatment that
would result from the Second Banking Directive inside the EC would
require fundamental changes in the way banks are regulated in the US.
That, of course, was not what the EC Commission sought to
achieve by its proposal. In fact, the Commission wanted some sort of
effective reciprocity with substantially equal chances for EC banks in
third-country markets, taking into account the regulatory system of
those third countries. Obtaining effective market access could require
more than simply ensuring internal treatment, and the Commission
was well aware that this would be a matter for negotiation in each case
with the third country in question because the matter is much too
complicated to be dealt with by a few general provisions.3' The Com-
mission amended its proposal in due course to clarify this point. The
reciprocity now required for the purposes of the authorization is "na-
tional treatment, . . . the same competitive opportunities as domestic
credit institutions in [the] third country [in question] and ... effective
market access . "32 If it appears that this condition is not fulfilled,
31. See, e.g., Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive of the Eurotiean Economic
Community and its importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 205 (1989).
32. Amended proposal for a Second Council Directive on the coordination of laws, regulations
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authorizations are limited or suspended. In addition, negotiations are
contemplated with third countries with a view to achieving effective
market access and competitive opportunities comparable to those ac-
corded by the Community to institutions of those third countries. 33
A cursory look at the international scene shows that what the EC
Commission proposes to do is quite normal. Requiring some form of
reciprocity is in fact a fairly generally-accepted practice as is shown in
various OECD documents, which, rather than condemn reciprocity,
are ambivalent to it. Moreover, it makes sense. It makes sense not
only from the point of view of the European Community, but also
from a wider perspective. It means that the liberalization of establish-
ment and services of financial institutions inside the European Com-
munity can become a tool to liberalize them in third countries as well.
In that event the mere selection of a building site for some fortifica-
tions of the European Community will have brought down some walls
in other countries to everybody's benefit.
E. STEIN:
This was an admirable overview of. subjects, some of which are
under direct discussion between the United States and the Commu-
nity. The Commission has proposed some 300 pieces of economic and
social legislation (later reduced to 279) as part of "Europe 1992." It
occurred to me, if you permit a brief general observation, that what
the Europeans are undertaking would be in a sense comparable in the
United States to a massive review of the entire legal structure of eco-
nomic regulation, aimed at dismantling some and expanding other fed-
eral regulatory schemes and preempting or invalidating virtually
thousands of state statutes. This may be a somewhat exaggerated view
of the scope of the European undertaking, but it is in principle what is
going on in Europe. If, for instance, the current proposals regarding
banking and insurance are fully implemented, there will be substan-
tially freer movement of services in this field than exists now in the
United States. And, as Jacques pointed out, the need to assure reci-
procity in the treatment of European financial enterprises may lead to
pressure on Congress to use its ample federal commerce power to der-
egulate and reduce state regulation, for instance in the insurance field
in which states discriminate even against companies coming from
other states of the Union.
and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institu-
tions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 167) 33 (1989) (art.
7(4)).
33. Id.
Winter 1990]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Our next speaker is Edwin Vermulst, a third generation Common
Market lawyer. He received his first legal education in the Nether-
lands and holds an LL.M degree and SJ.D from the Michigan Law
School. He has been in law practice in Brussels, but in his "free time"
he completed his doctoral thesis of 753 pages on American and Euro-
pean antidumping law that has just been published and should become
a leading treatise on the subject. He will deal with another important
phase of Community work concerning third countries: its trade
policy.
1992 AND THE EC's EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY
EDWIN VERMULST:
1. Introduction
Thank you very much. As Eric Stein already said, since I gradu-
ated from Michigan and returned to Brussels, I have spent most of my
time in the Far East in Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea, and so I proba-
bly know better how the people in those countries think about 1992
than how Europeans perceive it. My impression is that in the Far East
there is a widespread fear about 1992, a fear that has been fueled in
large part by the media and also by European businessmen who, per-
haps, see this as an opportunity to get back at countries such as Japan
and Korea which have been difficult to penetrate. The question is
whether that fear is justified. I believe it is very exaggerated. What I
propose to do is to give you a summary of the development of the EC
Commission's views on the external ramifications of 1992, and then I
will analyze how 1992 is likely to affect trade in goods and trade in
services.
2. General Review
As far as the Commission's thinking on the external aspects of
1992 is concerned, one can make a distinction between four phases.
The Commission's perceptions have clearly developed over time. In
the 1985 White Paper,34 which formed, and which still is, the heart of
the 1992 program, there were only short references to external aspects.
The Commission mentioned national import quotas - it said that
those would have to be abolished by the end of 1992 and that the
creation of one Common Market would necessarily lead to more inten-
sive control at the external frontiers essentially for security and safety
34. Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council (Milan, June 28 & 29, 1985), COM (85) 310 final (Brussels, June 14, 1985).
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reasons. This question of abolition of national quotas has attracted
vivid interest, partly created by the Commission itself, because the
Commission said in the White Paper that, in abolishing national quo-
tas, there can be considerable difficulties to overcome. Additionally, in
the absence of national quotas, import restrictions might have to be
implemented at the Community level. Thus, while only some coun-
tries currently have national quotas, by the end of 1992, these might
have to be replaced by quotas imposed on a Community-wide basis. 35
The second phase concerns the concrete measures that the Com-
mission proposed on the basis of the White Paper. Jacques Bourgeois
has elaborated on the first draft of the Second Banking Directive.
There was a similar reciprocity clause, as far as I know, in the life
insurance directive. In the public procurement sector, the Commis-
sion also proposed certain measures that might be disadvantageous to
third countries.
In the third phase, the Commission started giving some unofficial
guidelines on 1992. These were mainly contained in speeches by the
then Commissioner for External Relations, Mr. De Clercq, who was in
office until the end of 1988. In a speech of May 26, 1988, he said that
the completion of the single market must be accompanied by an active
trade policy. Mr. De Clercq said that 1992 would open up important
opportunities for all firms in the world but added that many additional
advantages for third countries could only be obtained on the basis of
reciprocity. He referred to three concrete areas: services, technical
standards, and public procurement. In a speech later that year in July,
Mr. De Clercq recalled that GATT does not cover all international
trade and that, in the absence of international obligations, concessions
would be negotiated on the basis of reciprocity, preferably multilater-
ally, but also bilaterally if necessary. External policy measures would
be used to give the EC leverage to open up as many markets as it
could. You can distill from this that the Commission also wants to
use 1992 also as an offensive weapon, as a weapon to force other coun-
tries to open up their markets.
Finally, in the fourth phase, in a document titled "Europe 1992:
Europe, World Partner,"' 36 the Commission enunciated its official po-
sition on the external aspects of 1992. It established four principles in
that paper. The single market will be of benefit to both European and
35. See also Commission Regulation No. 87/433/EEC on Surveillance and Protective Meas-
ures, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 238) 26 (1987), where the Commission announced that in
sectors such as cars, textiles, electronics, footwear and tableware, the abolition of national meas-
ures might have to be accompanied by back-up measures at the Community level.
36. EUROPE 1992: EUROPE, WORLD PARTNER (Oct. 19, 1989).
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non-European companies. Secondly, the EC would vigilantly apply
the instruments of commercial policy which it has at its disposal. The
third principle was that the Community would meet its international
obligations. And fourthly, where there are no multilateral rules the
EC is not disposed to grant non-EC countries automatic and unilateral
access to the benefits of the internal liberalization process unless they
can guarantee, even on a bilateral basis, a mutual balance of advan-
tages in the spirit of GATT. I would think this means satisfactory
access of EC companies to non-EC markets.
I will now go into more detail about the possible implications of
this for trade in goods and trade in services.
3. 1992 and International Trade in Goods
As far as trade in goods is concerned, there is a number of sensitive
sectors in the EC, sectors that have become increasingly vulnerable to
competition from third countries, particularly Asian countries. In
these sectors it seems likely that trade policy measures will sooner or
later be taken, not necessarily as a direct consequence of 1992, but
rather as a necessary corollary of the increased liberalization that 1992
will bring. These sectors are electronics, textiles, footwear, and cars.
In the electronics sector, there is a combination of strategies at
work, strategies pursued both at the company level and at the level of
the Commission. The companies are concentrating more and more
and merging to gear up for 1992. Secondly, they are increasingly
sourcing and producing outside of Europe. In some cases the Euro-
pean companies that complain about Asian dumping practices are set-
ting up factories in the same countries, either for sourcing the parts or
for making the complete products, and then exporting them to Eu-
rope. Thirdly, they probably will continue to have recourse to an-
tidumping measures to strengthen their manufacturing operations in
Europe as long as they are there. In 1985 there were cases against
typewriters, photocopiers and deep freezers; in 1986 against micro-
wave ovens; in 1987 against compact disc players, dot matrix printers,
daisy wheel printers, VCRs, EPROMs, DRAMs, and mobile tele-
phones; and in 1988, against video tape and color televisions. The
whole sector is essentially being targeted product by product for an-
tidumping action.
The EC Commission is also very active. It is actively supporting
high-definition television through the sanctioning of national funding
for research and development and pressing for adoption of the Euro-
pean standards as the world standard, and it is promoting the develop-
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ment of information technology products such as computers and
telephones through research programs such as Esprit.
As far as the textiles sector is concerned, in November, 1988, the
Commission presented a report on trends in this sector in which it
made a distinction between long-term trends and short-term trends.37
For the long term, the Commission saw positive signs. There had been
technical progress through automation and use of electronics, and a
tendency towards design and manufacture of higher quality products.
For the near future, the Commission perceived a very worrisome
trend: the increase in imports from Asian countries and from South
American countries. In the field of textiles, the Commission seems to
take an aggressive approach instead of a purely reactive one. The
Commission noted that many of' the developing countries have made
progress in liberalizing their own markets and that as long as this con-
tinues, the EEC is willing to liberalize its own market further. That
might eventually even mean the abolition of the multifiber arrange-
ment. (However, the EEC textiles industry is opposed to this.)
In the footwear sector the Commission has until recently taken a
laissez-faire approach, possibly because of the existence of industry-to-
industry arrangements with major Asian suppliers. The European
footwear producers, however, have been very active: they have noted
that imports have grown by sixty-nine percent in three years. They
want the Commission to do something about this. As a result of in-
dustry pressure, the Commission adopted safeguard measures against
exports of shoes by Korea and Taiwan to France and Italy on Febru-
ary 29 and June 30, 1988. On August 17, 1988, the Commission de-
cided to open a safeguard investigation into the trend of footwear
exports from these countries to the Community as a whole.
In the automobile sector, there has been much ado recently about
inward investment by Japanese companies in the EC. In 1988, a con-
flict erupted between France and England about how much local con-
tent Nissan cars produced in England needed to be able to qualify as
European products. As far as I know, France has backed down for
the moment from its initial stance that at least eighty percent EC
value-added was needed.
The common denominator of the activities in all these sectors is a
combination of internal action aimed at restructuring by the compa-
nies themselves and by the EC Commission, and at the same time,
active use of trade policy instruments as a means of giving the EC
37. Report on the Textile and Clothing Industry (presented by the Commission), COM (88)
653 Final (Nov. 21, 1988).
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industry breathing space for a couple of years in order to bring this
restructuring to a satisfactory end.
The most important Community trade policy instrument has been
the antidumping action. 38 The number of antidumping actions and
the importance thereof in terms of trade value affected has increased
exponentially since 1980, and the focus is shifting from countries such
as Japan to developing countries such as, a few years ago, Korea, and
now Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
Additionally, the EC lawmakers have strengthened the antidump-
ing law itself. In June, 1987, the EC Council adopted an amendment,
enabling itself to strike out at certain circumvention tactics it per-
ceived to take place within the EC. If an antidumping duty is imposed
on imports from a certain country, there is a stimulus for the produ-
cers in that country to shift production to another country to avoid
paying the duty. In many cases, such producers went to a third coun-
try or to the EC. Japanese companies very often went to the EC. The
EC institutions targeted that practice and decided that, under certain
circumstances, such intra-EC production constituted circumvention of
antidumping duties.39
In 1987 and 1988, there were also origin investigations in Hong
Kong and in the United States, where Japanese manufacturers of
photocopiers had set up plants. In the case of the U.S. plant of Ricoh,
the Commission found that the value added in the United States was
not sufficient to confer U.S. origin on the product, and therefore it
continued to be a Japanese product, subject to the antidumping duties
imposed on Japanese photocopiers in 1987.40 In the case of the Hong
Kong plant of Mita, the Commission reached the opposite conclusion.
Finally, in 1988, a new antidumping regulation was adopted which
pretended to be merely technical, but which in fact further strength-
ened the antidumping law. 4'
38. This has been the case not only in the EC, but also in other jurisdictions such as the
United States, Canada and Australia. See ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds. 1989).
39. For more details, see, e.g., Van Bael, Japanese Investment in the EEC- Trojan Horse or
Hostage, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 10 (June 1987).
40. On July 11, 1989, the Commission adopted a regulation defining the origin of
photocopiers which was essentially tailor made for the Ricoh situation. See Commission Regula-
tion No. 2071/89/EEC on the Origin of Photocopying Apparatus, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
196) 24 (1989).
41. Bellis, Vermulst & Waer, Further Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation: A Cod-
ification of Controversial Methodologies, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 21 (1989).
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4. 1992 and International Trade in Services
The final sector left to discuss is trade in services. Trade in services
is not covered by GATT, and therefore the Commission has felt fairly
free to do what it wants. Jacques has explained what the Commission
has done in general under the 1992 program in the services field. As
far as trade policy is concerned, the Council in 1986 already adopted a
regulation on unfair trade practices in maritime transport.4 2 Maritime
transport is another sector which is suffering difficulties in the EC.
This led the EC to adopt a regulation to deal with what it perceived to
be unfair trade by third countries in the shipping sector. The Commu-
nity institutions took certain elements of the countervailing duty law
and certain elements of the antidumping law and mixed them together
to be able to impose regressive duties, i.e., duties imposed at the EC
border, on foreign shipping companies which engaged in "unfair"
practices.43 The EC has gone ahead unilaterally in this respect. It has
not negotiated or discussed this in GATT, so it is not clear whether it
will extend this concept of unfair trade in shipping services to other
sectors, or whether shipping services will remain unique in this -re-
spect, with the EC authorities waiting until a multilateral agreement is
reached in GATT on how unfair trade in services should be treated.
In any event, if no multilateral consensus can be reached, it seems
likely that the increased liberalization in the EC service industries as a
result of 1992 will be accompanied by similar unilateral EC action in
other service sectors.
E. STEIN:
Thank you, Edwin, for the informative statement which displays a
happy combination of learned knowledge and practical experience. I
shall now call on our final panelist, Dr. R. Quick (LL.M. 1984), who
holds an important position in the private sector as Head of the Legal
Affairs Department of the European Council of the Federations of
Chemical Industry (CEFIC) in Brussels.
42. See Bellis, Vermulst & Musquar, The New EEC Regulation on Unfair Pricing Practices in
Maritime Transport: A Forerunner of the Extension of Unfair Trade Concepts to Services?, 22 J.
WORLD TRADE 47 (1988); Eisner, Unfair Pricing Practices in Maritime Transport, 23 EUR.
TRANSP. L. 590 (1988).
43. On January 4, 1989 the Council imposed a redressive duty on containerized cargo trans-
ported in liner service between the Community and Australia by the Korean company Hyundai.
See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 15/89 Introducing a Redressive Duty on Containerized Cargo,
32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L4) 1 (1989). The case is discussed in Vermulst, Commercial Defense
Actions and Other International Trade Developments in the European Communities: 1 July 1988 -
30 June 1989, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1990).
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THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND 1992:
VIEWS OF A GLOBAL INDUSTRY
REINHARD QUICK
When Lord Cockfield presented the White Book on the completion
of the Internal Market, the European chemical industry was relatively
indifferent as to the success of such a program. Many thought of it as
another political goodwill initiative which would undoubtedly fail.
This skepticism can be explained. The European chemical industry is
the world leader. It uses Europe as its home base but it does not con-
centrate on Europe alone; it competes successfully on a global scale.
Furthermore, many of our companies had learned to live with all the
inconveniences of Europe's fragmented markets.
The political support that Lord Cockfield's White Book in fact re-
ceived throughout the EEC made the chemical industry also jump on
the train. It developed a kind of 1992 euphoria. 1992 was the word of
the day and the chemical industry's whole-hearted support of the com-
pletion of the internal market became an integral part of our position
papers.
Then the Cecchini report was published and, although it demon-
strated real and potential gains for market integration, some of our
experts foresaw only modest gains for the chemical industry. Cecchini
was useful to the discussions within the industry because it re-intro-
duced an element of reality and forced us to substantiate the political
support for the Internal Market with arguments or criticism based on
what the industry really needed.
1. The Cecchini Report
Let us have a closer look at the predictions of the report. Consid-
ering the four different stages of integration specified in the report, it is
worth noting the relative effect of each one, as measured by potential
addition to gross domestic product.
The first one - the removal of barriers of trade - is the one that
attracts the most attention. The lifting of border restrictions, the har-
monization/approximation of the value-added tax ("VAT"), the free
movement of goods and people - these things have great public im-
pact. They have also a great impact on the chemical industry. The
magnitude of the problem becomes apparent with one figure: the
chemical industry has an intra-Community trade worth 70 billion Eu-
ropean Currency Units (One ECU equals approximately $1.10) in
1988. Even if the Cecchini report predicted only a modest economic
gain as a consequence of the removal of barriers to trade - 0.2 per-
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cent in GDP - the abolition of frontier-related controls is a prerequi-
site for other gains to be achieved by the creation of the internal
market. It is for this reason that the chemical industry has, in the
past, made several political statements on the internal market, such as
its support for the Commission's proposals on VAT.
The second measure, namely, the removal of barriers to produc-
tion, such as differing technical standards, will have a much greater
impact. Here Cecchini predicts a two percent jump in GDP. The
chemical industry, with the exception of pharmaceuticals, is not one of
the sectors most affected by technical trade barriers, and is not a pio-
neer as far as standardization or certification is concerned. It can live
with the "new approach;" it is, however, worried about too many leg-
islative efforts to harmonize standards. A more simple and direct way
would be to meet the European standards, which are now being
established by the European Committee for Standardization (CEN)
and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
(CENELEC). It is important to us that the details of industrial speci-
fication is left to industry to determine. The remaining two and one-
half years until 1992 will have to be used in that direction, and I am
afraid that industry has to become more active if it wants to stop bu-
reaucrats from suggesting legislation.
The third step - economies of scale - will bring another two
percent jump in GDP. For the industry, this is the single biggest driv-
ing factor in the quest for world markets, and a large domestic base
provides a vital head start. A word of caution might be appropriate
here. A large domestic base is certainly helpful, but the example of the
Swiss chemical industry demonstrates that it is not necessary to be-
come a world leader.
The European Chemical Industry Federation ("CEFIC") is not
the proper forum for discussing the strategies our member companies
will follow in order to get the size needed to achieve the necessary
economies of scale to compete.
Fourthly, Cecchini predicts another two percent jump in GDP by
way of increased competition. As with the third point, one could
again take a note of caution. Such a jump in GDP will only happen if
the competitive forces are allowed to operate effectively. Industrial
policies, state aids, and national restrictions on mergers may reduce
Cecchini's predictions considerably. The chemical industry backs the
Commission's policy to subject state aids to closer scrutiny, and is also
in favor of a Community-wide merger control, if it avoids double
controls.
To end this first point, I would like to repeat that, whatever deci-
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sions are made, the decisionmakers have to take into account that the
chemical industry has to compete on a global scale, and that it is
worldwide competition that counts, not just the competition within
the EEC.
2. External Aspects
That leads me to my second point: the external aspects of 1992 as
seen by the chemical industry. Here again, I would like to give you
just one figure: the European chemical industry exports, extra-EEC,
amounted to 51 billion ECU in 1988. If you remember that intra-
Community trade in chemicals amounts to 70 billion ECU you can
immediately see that our industry, because of its dependency on inter-
national trade, cannot espouse protectionism. The global quality of
the chemical industry is not only seen by import and export figures:
twenty-five percent of the European chemical industry belongs to U.S.
companies and roughly twenty-five percent of the U.S. chemical indus-
try belongs to European companies. A further aspect of our openness
lies in the fact that our toughest competitors are also our best clients.
Thus, there is no point in asking for protection.
When asked about the importance of the Uruguay Round com-
pared with 1992, the answer is simple: the two goals cannot be valued
separately, they are complementary. The chemical industry will profit
from both a more liberal multilateral trading system and the comple-
tion of the internal market, which also has to be an open market.
Our actions do not end with such general statements. We have
conducted a survey of existing national quotas for chemicals, and we
have seen that there are still some, but luckily not very many, quotas
in the Member States. Such quotas cannot exist any longer after 1992;
the Community has to develop an all-embracing common commercial
policy. The result of this survey is encouraging. Most of our members
have said that they could live without this protection and, even more
encouraging, they have said that in areas where some form of tempo-
rary protection is needed, such protection should only be granted if
the prerequisites of the safeguards clause are met. Here again we
could convince the industrialists of the need to be consistent when ad-
dressing the subjects of the Uruguay Round and 1992. In the context
of the former, the chemical industry has voiced its dislike of grey-area
measures. It has to honor its commitment also in the context of 1992.
There is, of course, demand for protectionism in the EEC, in par-
ticular in relation to 1992. I do hope that the Community proves with
deeds that the internal market will not close in on itself.
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3. Over-Legislation
Let me move to a different subject, namely the bitter pills of 1992.
By bitter pills I mean the tendency to over-legislate, along with the
inability of industry, though critical of this tendency, to develop the
consensus necessary to influence the decision-making process. So far,
I might have given you the impression that the chemical industry does
not have any problems with 1992. Well, there are some, and let me
cite some troubling examples.
We have said that an efficient internal market will help to sustain
the chemical industry's competitiveness in the world. Efficiency, as we
understand it, also means less bureaucracy and reliance on en-
trepreneurial responsibility. In some cases, however, we are faced
with over-legislation.
We sometimes have to fight an overly-active Commission which is
trying to regulate many aspects of industrial decision making, such as
in the draft directive concerning general product safety. It is indeed
questionable whether the obligation of economic operators to monitor
product safety has to be enforced by Community rules, when other
Community and Member States' instruments having an effect on prod-
uct safety are already in force. Should we instead follow the U.S. judi-
cial developments when regulating liability issues? Can one really
impose on an economic operator a general no-fault liability regime for
damages caused by waste, which goes so far as to make the operator
responsible for situations in which he no longer has control over the
waste? I don't think we can. Parallel to the tendency to over-legislate
are examples of under-legislation. One is the draft directive on patent-.
ability of biotechnological inventions, which does not go far enough.
We have two problems with the draft. One is that it generally ex-
cludes plant and plant materials from patentability. The other is the
very broad provision on compulsory licenses, which is not restricted to
cases of abuse.
Next, I come to distortions in the market caused by state interven-
tion, such as price controls. These controls are inconsistent with a
genuine internal market. We should let the market forces work. Is it
acceptable that, because of state intervention, prices for pharmaceuti-
cals will settle down to the level of the lowest common denominator?
If such a pricing and licensing system were applied to the post-1992
pharmaceutical industry, the big drug companies would shift their re-
search and development centers to markets outside the Community
with higher prevailing drug prices. Another market distortion is
caused by the lack of an open market in Europe for energy products,
with prices varying widely as a result. This can lead to considerable
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distortions in costs for energy-intensive industries, such as the chemi-
cal industry.
When speaking about bitter pills, I also must mention that there
are areas where industry cannot reach a consensus. If we take the
example of the proposed European company statute, I think that the
chemical industry will have a hard time arriving at a truly European
position. The German industry representatives are against it. They
fear that the alternatives on workers' participation in company man-
agement would lead to a "company flight" from Germany, and com-
panies would be founded outside the Federal Republic in order to
circumvent the strict German law on workers' participation., Other
European chemical industry representatives are against the proposal
because, in their view, it allows too much workers' participation.
4. Conclusion
In relation to the proposals of 1992, I would like to cite four ques-
tions which Denis Henderson, the Chairman of ICI, raised as a test of
relevance:
1. Will the proposals actually assist the process of creating wealth?
2. Will they add to or lessen the administrative burden?
3. Will they increase or decrease flexibility of operations?
4. Will they help us to compete internationally?
The result of this test of relevance is that the chemical industry sees
potential opportunities in 1992, but it is also concerned that the re-
quirements of industry are duly taken into account by Community
policy.
E. STEIN:
Thank you Reinhard for your most interesting comments. Before
opening the floor to questions I should like to take advantage of my
position as Chairman and call on my colleague, Professor John J.
Jackson, the Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law at Michigan, and ask
him to let us have the benefit of his broad expertise, particularly from
the perspective of American trade policy.44
E. STEIN:
Thank you, John. The floor is now open for questions.
44. Due to a technical error in the recording of the conference, the editors regret that they
have been unable to recover Professor Jackson's statement. We apologize for any confusion that
may result from references to Professor Jackson's lost comments.
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QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
H. HERMANS:
I would like to ask a question of Jacques Bourgeois. He made
clear to us, on the basis of the Cassis de Dijon case,45 that, once a
product from a third country has come into, say, Germany, the Ger-
man rules on safety regulations, or on the composition of the product
may not hinder the product if it has been in free circulation in any of
the other Common Market countries. Now this of course would lead
to the tendency of third country products to come in where the safety
regulations are easiest. If they are easiest in, say, Greece, then my
question to you would be how strict is the rule that they have to be in
free circulation in Greece before they can enter Germany. The foreign
products must fulfill the Greek conditions as the minimum, but do
they have to be transported to Greece before they go to Germany in
fact, or can they only pass through Greece? Can only a sample go
through Greece and the bulk directly to Germany? If it is stamped on
them "Greek requirements are fulfilled," is that enough? To what ex-
tent is the requirement that an American product wanting to go to
Germany under Greek conditions must fulfill the Greek conditions
and to actually be in free circulation in Greece a real burden for the
product, which may make it easier to fulfill the German requirements
and go directly to Germany? If you could enlighten me on that point,
I would be grateful to you. Thank you.
J. BOURGEOIS:
Let me first say that the Cassis de Dijon46 doctrine has a certain
number of safeguards built into it, but that has no bearing on the dis-
tinction between a product originating in a Member State and a third
country product. There are thus exceptions to the Cassis de Dijon doc-
trine. Secondly, the Cassis de Dijon doctrine applies when there is no
Community-wide harmonization of the rules of production and mar-
keting. Subject to this the Cassis de Dijon doctrine implies accepting
the risk that a third country manufacturer uses the least restrictive
Member State as its home base to sell throughout the Community.
But an EC manufacturer could also use the least restrictive Member
State as its home base. As to your second more technical question,
there are two possible situations. In the first situation where there is-a
form of certification, there should be no major problem. In the second
45. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fuir Braantwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
46. Rewe-Zentral AG, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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situation without certification, there is indeed a risk that compliance
with the quality rules of the Member State of entry is not effectively
verified. One of the ways to deal with it is to require that the product
be effectively put on the market in that Member State of entry.
H. HERMANS:
Does your answer then not militate in favor of unified rules of
manufacturing in order to avoid distortions within the Common Mar-
ket where the most favorable state is chosen by all importers?
I have a second question: there is doubt in my mind about article
58. If a company is established in the Community, in principle, it is
considered an EEC company, but what I have seen in practice is that,
in many instances, in order to be admitted to a committee - for in-
stance the Committee on Technical Standards - the company which
is established in the EEC must be a manufacturer in the EEC. I would
like to have your views on that.
J. BOURGEOIS:
As to the first question, this is indeed a position that can be taken
and a position that has been taken. It is a question of balance, and the
Commission has, after Cassis de Dijon,47 opted for a more liberal ap-
proach, based on mutual recognition, saying what is good enough for a
Greek consumer should be good enough for a German consumer, sub-
ject to the safeguards of the Cassis de Dijon doctrine itself, which may
be important and which entail derogations from the free circulation of
goods. That is, in fact, deregulation in a wider EC market. Establish-
ing harmonized rules is not excluded, e.g., precisely for matters cov-
ered by the exceptions of the Cassis de Dijon doctrine. In fact, a series
of harmonized rules has been proposed by the EC Commission.
As to the question about article 58, that article states that, for the
purposes of the right of establishment, companies incorporated in one
Member State and having their principal place of business, etc., in that
Member State are to be treated as companies of that Member State.
The same applies for the freedom to provide services. But the EEC
Treaty does not go further. I can imagine that, for certain consultative
bodies, EC subsidiaries of foreign companies are not assimilated to EC
companies. It may be unwise, but it is not inconsistent with article 58
of the EEC Treaty.
47. Rewe-Zentral AG, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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R. BROWN:
I wanted to raise a question for Jacques Bourgeois and Edwin
Vermulst about establishing a subsidiary in a country within the EEC
and the use of that subsidiary as a means of circumvention. Specifi-
cally, I refer to the Nissan auto case in the U.K. where that issue has
been raised, with the percentage of EEC content in their automobiles
being brought into question. The U.K. is arguing that Nissan's ac-
tions are proper. France is, of course, arguing very strongly against
this. The matter is not settled yet, as I understand it, and it seems to
involve circumvention. According to what you say, there should be
no question about this. What is your answer to that?
J. BOURGEOIS:
I think we should make a distinction here with respect to the ex-
ample cited. What I want to say is that if the Nissan subsidiary in the
UK wants to create another subsidiary in France, it is entitled to do
so. The question that arises here is whether the cars assembled by
Nissan in the UK can be considered as cars originating in the Euro-
pean Community. Why is that relevant? It is because there still are
exceptional provisions that deal with a situation where the trade policy
of the European Community is not yet uniform, where one Member
State is entitled to maintain certain restrictions vis-A-vis direct third-
country imports, while the import regime vis-i-vis third countries in
another Member State is free. This is the situation in the automobile
sector: direct imports of cars from Japan into Italy are subject to re-
strictions. And in order to prevent circumvention, there is a provision
under the EEC Treaty that allows Italy to be authorized by the Com-
mission to limit this intra-Community trade in Japanese cars. That is
the so-called article 115 procedure. It is in this connection that the
question arises, whether a Nissan car assembled in the UK is a Com-
munity car or not. If it is not a Community car, then France can be
authorized by the Commission to stop the imports of Nissan cars from
the UK. In order to decide whether it is a Community car, one has to
apply the rules of origin, according to which the place of the last sub-
stantial transformation confers the origin. This is a vague criterion.
According to France, less than eighty percent added value is not a
substantial transformation, while according to the UK, sixty percent
added value is enough. As long as the Commission does not rule on
this in an implementing regulation, or the Court does not interpret this
vague criterion, there will be a dispute about it. That is not directly
linked, as I would see it, to article 58.
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Questions have been raised regarding the draft of the second bank-
ing directive which requires third countries to grant reciprocity to EC
credit institutions. I think that the proposal goes a bit further than
requiring national treatment: it also states that EC 'redit institutions
must have effective market access. Furthermore, negotiations are con-
templated to secure competitive opportunities comparable to those ac-
corded by the Community to the credit institutions of that third
country.
The first draft referred to reciprocal treatment without defining it;
it could in fact have meant "mirror-image" reciprocity which would
have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to negotiate
with the European Community. This "mirror-image" reciprocity was
not intended originally anyway. Effective market access is something
more than national treatment and something less than "mirror-image"
reciprocity.
E. STEIN:
This shows what a potentially potent protectionist instrument the
Community would have by combining the rules of origin, the rules for
local content, the import quotas, and technical regulations; if you can,
as John Jackson indicated, manipulate these four little instruments
you can really have a pretty nice protectionist device. But I don't
think that that's really in the cards, that the Community would want
- and could afford - to engage in this sort of policy. Dr. Quick has
indicated that the world has become a village and one would assume
that it is in everyone's interest to play the competitive game according
to the acceptable rule.
E. VERMULST:
Of course, by 1992, those national quotas, the quotas that coun-
tries like France and Italy have on cars, should be abolished. By that
time, the whole issue of origin will become moot because then, wher-
ever a car is imported into the Community, it will be in free circula-
tion. Secondly, the old French position that Nissan had to have at
least eighty percent U.K. content is of course an outrageous unilateral
interpretation of origin rules and has no precedent in any other rules.
It's just a unilateral French position.
F. REICHERT-FACILIDES:
May I touch briefly on two topics? The first one is a political topic
arising from the viewpoint of those countries which Professor Jackson
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has referred to as the locked-out countries, this time, locked-out coun-
tries within Europe, especially Switzerland and Austria. We have
quite a few colleagues here from Switzerland, and of course we would
be interested in hearing something from them about the very decided
viewpoint of their country towards not applying for EEC membership.
Austria has rather hesitatingly taken a different view. It is going to
apply for membership in the Community, but has not yet done so, and
the prospects for its application's success are not easy to judge. Pro-
fessor Frowein has taken the view today that its chances are not won-
derful. Anyhow, as an observer of the Austrian scene, I would think
that it is a good step, this Austrian application, for at least two rea-
sons. It puts this country in the position of a procedural partner to-
wards the Community. I think it has a stronger right of information
and a stronger right of discussion than a stranger to the Community.
Second, things are changing. The Community process is dynamic, and
reasons that might today speak against Austrian membership may ap-
pear in a different light two or three years from now when, for in-
stance, in the prospect of closer combination with the Eastern
European states, Austria has quite a tradition of experience to offer.
This is my first point, the political one.
The second point is a predominantly legal or technical one with an
internal Community bearing: the role of private law in the process
leading towards '92. What has private law to do with the internal
market? Well, the harmonization of private law may impact the crea-
tion of the market. Very briefly, some alternatives. The first one
would be the harmonization of private laws forming an impediment to
free competition. The second would be, to the contrary, competition,
not only with products but with the conditions under which these
products can be sold. Under private law aspects, a stronger liability
for the producer makes for more competition within the market. As
we have different products, one could argue that it is better for the
consumer if he can choose between different private law models - a
viewpoint which has been taken or which is still being taken, for in-
stance, in the field of insurance law, which Professor Stein has touched
upon. The third aspect would involve solving the problem by means
of private international law, providing at least that, before every Euro-
pean court, private international law as harmonized could be applied.
Thus, at least in every court, one and the same private law material
order would apply, which would be much more than what we have
now under the different private international law systems. The fourth
and last possibility would be to create at least a common European
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order publique in private law, to create some identical minimum stan-
dards in private law culture.
To conclude, it would be extremely interesting to hear the opinion
of one or another member of this panel on these private law points. As
to my very personal view, I have only indicated the private interna-
tional law solution combined with the creation of a common European
order publique, which I think would present the most promising
aspects.
E. STEIN:
As I understand it, the Austrian Government has not made up its
mind whether to apply for Austrian membership in the Community,
but there is every indication that it will. The role of the Soviet Union
with respect to this decision will be interesting.48 There is also the
question of the relationship between the Community and the other five
members of the European Free Trade Association which includes, in
addition to Austria, the Scandinavian states and Switzerland. These
countries have been pressing the Community for a broadening of their
current agreement with the Community that would allow them to
profit as much as possible from the ongoing liberalization of the Com-
munity market. And this of course is of interest to other "third coun-
tries" that do business with Europe.
Now Mr. Buechner is next on my list.
B. BUECHNER:
For the position of Germany, I would like to refer to Professor
Frowein's presentation. We heard a lot about the influx of goods into
the Community, but what about the influx of people? I am specializ-
ing in asylum and in immigration, and I wonder if Europe will be a
fortress after 1992 against people, against people who flee from polit-
ical persecution and against people who come from other countries in
order to work in the Community, and I wonder if I will be without a
job after that time.
J. FROWEIN:
Just very briefly to respond to that, I would be quite astonished if
you should really be out of a job by that time. I suppose you will be
faced with a very difficult and complex question. There is no doubt,
for instance, that in the Federal Republic of Germany, which has the
48. Editors' note: subsequent to the panel discussion Austria filed its application on July 17,
1989. The application of Turkey and Morocco are also pending.
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only constitutional rule in the world which gives a full individual right
to asylum to anybody who comes and can prove that he is persecuted
for his political ideas or other political reasons, many people at this
moment think that some harmonized European solution must be
found before 1992 arrives. As far as I can see, however, we are far
from having any acceptable proposals on the books at the moment.
Within the Federal Republic, I think there is another stream of
thought. The second stream finds it unacceptable that the develop-
ment of the European Community should lead to the abolition of one
of the most important, let's say, fundamental decisions of the constitu-
tion makers in 1949, which was of course taken on the background of
what had happened in Germany from 1933 to 1945. Now what the
solution will be I don't know yet, but I think this is a very important
and very difficult issue.
P. MACKAY:
As a citizen of New Zealand, which is a very locked-out country
and a resident in the Community, I have two concerns upon which I
would like the panel to comment. The first one is that I have become
concerned as I have listened to the discussion that we are really talk-
ing about the interests of producers here. It seems to me that there is a
possibility that the interests of consumers, who are of course real peo-
ple-in the Community, do get sidetracked. Antidumping duties and
reciprocity have two effects, don't they? The problem is, it seems to
me, that a lot of European consumers want to buy cheap Japanese
photocopiers or Japanese cars, and the question is, should they really
be denied that opportunity. It seems to me that the second question is
what effect this has on third world countries or small countries like
New Zealand. If you just look at a European-wide situation, you are
really ignoring the damage that can be done economically, for exam-
ple, to the agricultural policy of countries like New Zealand. I just
wondered what comments the panel a might have on these issues.
E. STEIN:
The way the world is changing - when I was getting into this field
fifteen years ago, no New Zealander would talk about the Community
without talking about New Zealand butter. You have seen how the
world has changed. And of course the consumers seem to be short-
changed everywhere. I think it has been a generally-accepted rule that
the consumers were the least well-organized interest group in Europe.
I have a feeling that is also changing, although I don't know how
strongly. But obviously this is a very important interest and it suffers.
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In the United States, we suffer from our own restrictions - I have just
seen some figures on steel, and the special restrictive agreements on
imports of steel cost us I don't know what percentage of the price of
the automobile. So that is a very pertinent observation.
M. HANSEN:
This discussion could give rise to a lot of questions I think, but let
me leap with one. Jacques, John was speaking about your optimism
before and we have heard a lot about what the Commission has been
doing in numerous initiatives in recent years. There is incredible mo-
mentum and my question is really what does the panel think about the
powers of the Commission in an atmosphere such as the present,
where there is in fact very little Parliamentary control, and where
there is virtually no openness in the administration.
J. BOURGEOIS:
Before addressing the question let me say two things. Last year I
sat on a panel in Germany trying to draw comparisons between the
U.S. Constitution and the EC "Constitution." Surprise! The Ameri-
can academic was Terry Sandalow of the University of Michigan Law
faculty. Recently, a Belgian magazine published a picture of a Mem-
ber of the European Parliament working on a draft EC bill of rights
with a team of advisors. Surprise! One of these advisors was Joseph
Weiler of the same faculty. Maybe one of the areas in which we can
learn something from U.S. constitutional practice is transparency in
the decision-making process. In going over the procedures the Com-
mission of the European Communities was using by way of trans-
parency in the decision-making process, I came up with more than I
would have expected. For instance, the Commission has the power to
adopt implementing antitrust legislation. Whenever the Commission
intends to do so, it publishes a draft in the Official Journal and invites
comments from all the people concerned. The most recent examples
are in the aircraft and maritime transport sectors. Secondly, when the
Commission investigates antidumping allegations or antisubsidy coun-
tervailing duty ("CVD") cases, it announces the investigation and in-
vites all interested parties to submit comments. By interested parties,
the Commission means much more than just the importers, the do-
mestic producers, the complainants and the exporters. In fact, if you
look at the legislation, it means that even consumers have the right to
submit comments in these proceedings. They don't do it very often,
but that's another matter. The decision-making process is in fact
much more open than one would expect of a European administration,
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and when I say European administration I mean a British, French,
German, Spanish or Italian administration. In fact, when you look at
what is happening with respect to decision-making processes at the
national level in matters that are now taken up Community-wide, I
think the process is much more open than it used to be at the national
level. That is an important element. It is probably not open enough, I
agree, but it is already much more open than it used to be at the na-
tional level in a whole series of matters.
R. BROWN:
You remember, the franchisers were very worried but they came to
Europe and found complete openness; they had meetings with all the
key people in the European Community, and they felt that it was
much more open than in America. Americans got 96.5 percent of
what they wanted, the Americans from the outside got that.
E. STEIN:
My experience in talking to American lawyers and business people
has been that it is difficult to find where to go in Brussels. If you
identify the proper person in the Commission, you will usually find
openness and cooperation. There are something like 12,000 officials in
Brussels and the problem is to find the right person, the right Jacques
Bourgeois. That has been my experience, as a rule, in talking to
American lawyers.
Dr. Quick would like to add a few comments.
R. QUICK:
I would like to comment on the question from the colleague from
New Zealand regarding the interest of the consumer and whether that
should be taken into account when applying the Community's trade
instruments. I think I would agree to take it into account in cases of
the Safeguards Clause, Regulation 288, because here we deal with fair
imports. I disagree completely with his view that we should rely on
consumer interest when applying the antidumping or countervailing
duty law. This is not only because we deal with unfair trade, but also
because of the inherent risk of a discriminatory application of the law.
The chemical industry has always seen the subjects of antidumping or
countervailing duty as technical issues. Do not let politics or politi-
cians get involved in such issues. The cases Edwin referred to, partic-
ularly those in the electronics industry, have made the whole subject
controversial on a political level. If we bring politicians into the game,
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then politicians will speak for consumer interests, and in some cases
the antidumping duty will be reduced and in others not. Hence, the
resulting application of the law can only be discriminatory. I would
fear that if you take account of the consumer interest, the complaining
industry will flex its political muscle even more strongly, and, who do
you think will win in the end? I am afraid that we should not stress
the consumer interest too much in the discussion of what is the Com-
munity interest in the antidumping and countervailing duty law. Our
industry has always said that it could live with the Community inter-
est, but if you ask them today whether they would accept taking into
account consumer interests, I think they would flatly say: "No! We
don't want them." Dumping is dumping, and if there is dumping,
there should be measures against it because it is unfair trade. That,
incidentally, is exactly what the U.S. does since there is no U.S. public
interest provisions in the antidumping and countervailing duty law.
E. VERMULST:
Of course, Reinhard and I are rather on opposite sides of the fence
because he works for the European chemical industry and I work
mainly for foreign import-export firms. It has been my experience that
political influence had been exerted, until a few years ago, only by the
domestic industries, which brought to bear political interests on the
EEC institutions to find certain dumping margins and to reach certain
results, to accept or reject the undertakings. Until a few years ago,
foreign companies did not do that, but they have learned, of course, to
play the game. By now, they are exhorting their importers and con-
sumers to write letters to the Commission to point out that certain
measures also have an impact on consumers, and not just on the pro-
ducing industry. What I have heard from people in the Commission,
however, is that if a thing like that happens, they call the domestic
industry and say, "Okay, I've just received a letter from a Community
importer saying that it is not in his interest to impose protective meas-
ures, so why don't you supply me with five letters saying that it is in
the interest of the EEC."
J. JACKSON:
The notion that you can insulate antidumping or various fair trade
laws from political influence is absurd. In fact, there is a lot of this
going on in the U.S. system. The U.S. system has a number of safe-
guards that the European system does not have, including a much
heavier layer of appeal to the courts, which of course has transactional
costs, but also has some fairness insurance advantages, and so on. I
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think one of the fundamental things that we are learning is that the so-
called level playing field idea and fair trade laws are often used as an
excuse by the politicians to rig the system against imports; that is one
of the things that we are learning in the antidumping area in particu-
lar. The whole antidumping law sits on a very shaky intellectual foun-
dation. But even more shaky are the detailed calculations that are
made by the so-called disinterested caseworkers in all the major sys-
tems that use it. There are four major countries that use it in a signifi-
cant way, and those detailed calculations are taken in such a way that
there is very little question in my mind that there is a tilt against im-
ports. Now, one of the things that is happening in Europe is the devel-
opment of a very constructive and more informed debate on just that
question than has actually occurred in the United States. This has
begun to be played out in the pages of the Financial Times of London.
I encourage you to watch for that debate. It's going to continue. Sev-
eral people tackled me while I was in London, talking about various
works that they have underway.
R. LAUWAARS:
First, I found food for thought when John Jackson was speaking
and describing the European integration process and the time over
which it had been going on. He was speaking about a decade or two
or three. I was thinking that the difference was General DeGaulle.
You may have your own thoughts about that.
A more serious point is, you could say, the matter of reciprocity.
I've been a participant in some heated discussions with American col-
leagues about, in particular, the notion of reciprocity. Those discus-
sions took place in the fall of this year, and I think it might be useful
to stress that there has now been a change, if I have understood Jac-
ques Bourgeois correctly, and we should make a sharp distinction be-
tween what Jacques called "reflective reciprocity" (what you could
call "mirror reciprocity") that is, a requirement that EEC firms should
have exactly the same rights in the United States as U.S. firms or sub-
sidiaries of U.S. firms have in the internal market of the EEC, and
national treatment. The latter notion means that an EEC firm should
have the same rights in the United States as a U.S. firm, and U.S. firms
should have in the EEC exactly the same rights as an EEC firm. Is it
correct to say that there has been a change in attitude with respect to
the two notions of reciprocity that have been presented by the Com-
mission in its proposals?
Is it true that, in the latest version of the banking directive propo-
sal, you can find references to both notions of reciprocity, but that the
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most important one, and the one which is the core of the directive on
this point, is reciprocity in the meaning of national treatment?
J. BOURGEOIS:
Does what Richard Lauwaars is saying about the change due to
the Commission's amendment of the second banking directive as pro-
posed mean that the sole requirement would be national treatment? I
think that the proposal goes a bit further than that, because it says that
the EEC credit institutions must have effective market access and
competitive opportunities comparable to those accorded by the Com-
munity to the credit institutions of that third country. I think that it is
going a bit further than just national treatment.
E. STEIN:
The proposal requires first that the financial institutions of the
Community must enjoy in the third country national treatment; sec-
ond, that they must be given the same comparative opportunities as
domestic credit institutions have in the third country; and third, that
they must be afforded effective market access in the third country.
You have these three elements there and the Commission could, if it
wanted to do so, manipulate them very nicely, so I don't feel that there
has been such a great change in the drafting of the banking directive
proposal. Do you agree with that?
J. BOURGEOIS:
I think that the first draft spoke about reciprocal treatment with-
out defining it, and that could in fact have meant a mirror reciprocity,
which would of course have made it impossible for the U.S. to negoti-
ate with the European Community on that question. Such mirror rec-
iprocity was not intended at the beginning. What I meant to say is,
well, what do your banks get from access?
S. VLACHOS:
I would like to refer mostly to Professors Stein and Frowein and to
ask some questions about the Single European Act. It appears to me,
and I would like to be corrected if I am wrong, that the Single Euro-
pean Act could be considered as a constitutional or a pre-constitu-
tional document, in other words as a document of fundamental value,
in the sense that it greatly transforms the Common Market from a
"market" to a "community" by creating, perhaps at a very initial
stage, a federal or quasi-federal state. When you have, for the first
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time, regulations with provisions concerning foreign policy, and hints
in those provisions about national security and so forth; when you
have environmental, research and development provisions, and others
that certainly go beyond the concept of a market as such; when you
have an upgrading of the EEC parliament (which before the Act was
not even called a parliament) requiring its consultation in many in-
stances, don't you think that this Act tends to open, or rather, opens a
transitory stage of an undetermined period - it may be five, ten or
twenty years - whereby, with the creation of a common European
currency, the Community is pushed toward becoming a federal state?
J. FROWEIN:
I fully agree with my friend and colleague, Spyros Vlachos. We
both belong to the 1957-58 class, which is well represented here. We
are now, I think, all together five, which is quite amazing, the foreign
students group. Now, I fully agree with Spyros Vlachos that the Sin-
gle Act is of course, and was intended to be, an additional constitu-
tional document. But let's not close our eyes when we evaluate the
progress. The foreign policy that used to be a merely Community-
based sort of gentleman's agreement, is now part of a treaty system,
but it is not part of the EEC system, properly speaking. States were
eager not to have foreign policy mixed up with the Community sys-
tem, thus showing us that our governments are still very reluctant to
give up real power. Let me make one other point in the context of
EEC foreign jurisdiction: is it not somehow troublesome that in spite
of the very interesting developments outlined by John Jackson, who
saw a sort of increasing power base for the contact with the world
outside Europe, we still have not really implemented article 113, be-
cause in many respects we still prolong the situation which existed
before by a continuation of the earlier treaty system? Of course, con-
cerning new treaties, the Community is fully competent, but in many
areas no treaties were in fact concluded, and the old system is still
being prolonged. If you take the ERTA49 judgment in which the
Court defined the Community treaty-making power in very broad
terms, it is probably the only big one by the Court which has not had
real consequences in fact. We frequently describe it to our students as
the third or fourth step of integration, but the consequences of it, I
think, were rather limited; indeed, the Commission stated in a famous
report to the House of Lords that in fact it is difficult to find clear
49. Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263.
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examples where the Community jurisdiction was only based on that
judgment.
E. STEIN:
Just a footnote to the most helpful remarks by Spyros Vlachos and
Jochen Frowein. The Court of Justice has defined the treaty-making
powers of the Community in the broadest terms at the expense of the
national treaty powers of the Member States. The Member States in
the Council have refused to go as far as the Court would let them go in
the direction of exclusive Community power, and have insisted that
when it comes to subjects other than the traditional commercial pol-
icy, the treaties must be in the form of the so-called "mixed agree-
ments," that is, both the Community and the Member States must be
parties. My colleague, Professor Joseph Weiler, suggested that we
have here a novel confederal pattern of treaty power that generally
does not exist in other divided-power systems such as federations. In
federations, the inexorable tendency has been for the federal authori-
ties to assert exclusive power in the foreign affairs field. In Europe,
because of the unique situation, a different pattern of shared federal
and state power is emerging.
J. BOURGEOIS:
May I add something? The article by Joseph Weiler to which Eric
is referring has been published in a book called Mixed Agreements, and
one of the co-editors of the book is Professor Henry Schermers of Lei-
den, who is with us today.
J. DROLSHAMMER:
There has been a gentleman from Austria and an American gen-
tleman living in Switzerland saying something about Switzerland. Let
me say a few words. In Switzerland, people are a little worried that
EEC countries are monopolizing Europe as a notion. I think every-
body in Switzerland very much thinks and believes that they are part
of Europe. If you try to analyze the relationship, you have to start
from the very basic economic facts. Switzerland, most likely, from an
economic point of view, is more integrated into the EEC than some of
the EEC countries themselves. The EEC is the largest trading partner
of Switzerland, but Switzerland is the second largest trading partner of
the EEC in absolute figures, making up, I think, almost eighty percent
of the trade deficit between the EEC and Japan. Now, with that back-
ground, Switzerland, after 1972, based upon the so-called "develop-
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ment clause" in the Free Trade Treaty, has very pragmatically
developed its relationship with the EEC. There have been about 130
treaties concluded in the meantime. The "wave" after 1985 certainly
has hit Switzerland as well. Last fall, the Federal Council issued a
very basic position paper. Of course, the basic position is no accession
to membership in the Community - if you read between the lines -
at least not half the time. The basic position is a pragmatic, very in-
tensive approach by bilateral and multilateral means. Most recently,
using the vehicle of the European Economic Space which is based
upon the Luxembourg Declaration of 1985, after the Delors speech on
the future relationship between the EEC and European Free Trade
Association ("EFTA"), ministers got together in Oslo last fall, and
you will see very intensive negotiations in the near future.
I would like to point out a few interesting aspects. Switzerland's
more difficult problem is the Uruguay Round because the Swiss have a
special agricultural regime which GATT will force them to change;
this will create just as difficult an internal problem in Switzerland as
the relationship with the EEC.
A second remark: Switzerland has recently introduced a test of
"Euro-compatibility" as regards all of its new legislation. Therefore,
there is a lot of direct and indirect harmonization taking place. The
Swiss legislature cannot afford any longer to disregard developments
within the EEC. A similar mark in that direction is the sociological
fact that Swiss multinational firms, which, because of the "effects"
principle, have to address various foreign standards when they deter-
mine how to behave in the markets, usually behave on the Swiss mar-
ket according to the stiffest and strongest foreign rules. So, there
again, you have a very "direct" indirect effect.
Let me end with a remark with respect to education. Switzerland
presently, in my view, does not have enough people that can cope in-
tellectually with the mass of problems coming up right now. I was
with you, Professor Stein, in 1970-71. 1 had to go all the way to Ann
Arbor to hear for the first time something about EEC law,, and I can
tell you it has not become much better in Switzerland in the meantime.
E. STEIN:
Maybe lawyers trained in EEC law should be our new export in-
dustry. We need one. Speaking of Swiss agriculture, one has to go to
Switzerland to see the problem. In the 1960's, when the debate raged
in Switzerland over its position toward the EEC, my wife and I were
invited by the Swiss government to tour the country and to see why
the Swiss agriculture cannot be made subject to the common agricul-
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tural policy. A member of the Federal Council told us: "Our farmers
manicure the country for us and for tourists. They are manicurists,
and therefore we cannot accept a policy that would force them to leave
the land in the interest of cost efficiency."
The next speaker is Dr. Meng from the Heidelberg Max Planck
Institute.
W. MENG:
Listening this morning to the complaints about overregulation and
about countertendencies, it came to my mind that there is one
counterforce that is still quite silent. Perhaps the army has not yet
lined up what it may be able to do. I am speaking of the labor unions.
We haven't seen much interest from this side yet, but this might
change - and they will give us a hard time then. 1992 is not yet
finished in that respect. It affects social standards, and those stan-
dards are quite different in the twelve Member countries. They are
cost factors, so you have to do something with them: either harmo-
nize them or open up the competition.
Take our German standards regarding workers' participation in
company management. They are unprecedented in Europe, I think,
and you can hardly conceive that the other governments will all be
ready to accept such standards. Great Britain, for example, is com-
pletely opposed to it. As far as the Community is concerned, you
have, as yet, a very vague statement by the Economic and Social
Council about a "Social Charter," and you have an even more evasive
statement by Jacques Delors about the legal significance and norma-
tive character of such a charter. So I don't have much hope for
harmonization.
Then, take the second solution, namely, competition. This would
mean that there would be some tendency to adopt the lowest common
denominatpr for social standards. Thinking about the situation in
Germany, however, I can hardly imagine that the labor unions would
be ready to give up terrain on this question. Those are vested rights in
our country and I think it would cause social unrest if we had to revert
to the lowest common denominator. So there is some motivation for
the labor unions to unify in the remaining three years and to find a
common position. If this common position is found, everything per-
taining to company law and changing rules about free services will
become much harder to resolve because there will be a lot of claims by
the labor unions that will not easily be accepted by the governments.
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E. STEIN:
There is a newsletter published by a respectable Washington or-
ganization, the Bureau of National Affairs, which predicted that in the
first year, 1993, 39,000 companies in Europe will have difficulties and
500,000 workers will lose their jobs. I have no idea where they got the
figures and whether they are accurate, but that's one element support-
ing what Mr. Meng has said.
R. RAITH:
I have just one remark on the antidumping issue which we ad-
dressed before. I am in the antidumping division of the Commission
and thus have the pleasure to see the arguments that are brought for-
ward from industry, from the exporters, and I would like to draw your
attention to the fact that, in cases where there is a strong consumer
interest, where the consumer is not the final, private consumer but
where the consumers themselves are powerful industries, they are a
major, maybe the major party to the case. I myself am conducting the
DRAM and EPRIM antidumping proceedings, and I can tell you that
I spend much more time with the consumers than I spend with any
other group of parties involved, so it really depends on whether you
are speaking of paintbrushes from China which are sold in big chain
department stores to the final hobby painter, or whether you are
speaking about semiconductors which are sold to huge powerful com-
panies like IBM. Therefore, I tend to disagree with Edwin's remark
that the consumers are only puppets of either the EC producers or of
the exporters. IBM is certainly neither the puppet of the Japanese
DRAM exporters nor of the European DRAM producers. And just
in brackets, coming back to the free movement of goods argument, I
would like to put a drop of vinegar into the Cassis de Dijon 50 principle
by pointing out what should be clear in our minds, that even if a prod-
uct from a third country is introduced into free circulation in the
EEC, it will not be treated for all purposes exactly like a European
product. This issue has come up very recently and was of great con-
cern to the electronics manufactures association of the United States.
In fact, they were in Brussels a couple of weeks ago because the rules
of origin are still a very important factor. If you have, say, semicon-
ductors of United States origin, this may be decisive for the origin of
the product into which they are finally put. It might be of crucial
importance for the origin of a work station or a computer and this, in
turn, will be crucial for the treatment in the trade, say, between the
50. Rewe-Zentral AG, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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EEC and EFTA because, if the product is considered as not being of
EEC origin, then it does not qualify for the privileges if exported to
EFTA. In the framework again of antidumping proceedings, rules of
origin may be crucial as well because, in the circumvention area, the
origin of components is essential in order to establish the value ratio
for the parts and materials used. So rules of origin will continue to
play an important role even after 1992.
E. STEIN:
Actually the Texas firm that is involved in this problem, I under-
stand, is seriously thinking of setting up an operation in Europe, and is
making up its mind where it will build.
M. PUTTFARKEN:
I have a question concerning free trade and services. It was men-
tioned that there is a first regulation on shipping, on maritime trade
and on countervailing duties against dumping in that trade. How
would you establish dumping here? There are two different situations.
One is our scapegoat, the Soviet and other Eastern block fleets em-
ploying their own labor below cost and then selling their transporta-
tion at cut-rate prices in order to earn hard currency. This is what we
suspect, although a recent study has found shipping to be one of the
few profitable branches of the Soviet industry. The second situation
may be more important in this context. German or other European
shipping companies bring their ships under foreign flags (Cyprus, Li-
beria, or Panama), employ cheap labor under those flags and below
European standards, labor from the Philippines or Kiribati or some-
where else, and then sell transportation within Europe at cut-rate tar-
iffs. Would this be dumping? If so, what are the criteria for a
company being European, as this scheme operates through wholly-
owned foreign subsidiaries at Singapore or Panama or Monrovia? Fi-
nally, and depending perhaps on the criteria, would not the idea of a
unified European market push in two directions, the first one obvi-
ously being, "Foreigners, please keep out," but also in the opposite
direction, being, "Europeans, please keep within. Stay within under
the standards of your labor market and labor law, trade unions and
social security, taxation and the whole international framework of
competition?"
E. VERMULST:
Under this regulation, a very hybrid regulation, the objectionable
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practice is the provision of subsidies in any form whatsoever. For ex-
ample, exclusive cargo reservation schemes can be subsidies. The
point is, how do you measure such subsidies? It's very difficult, so
what the Council has done is to borrow the surrogate producer con-
cept from the antidumping law and use that to measure the benefit of
the subsidy. They look at the price charged by the foreign producer
accused of having received a subsidy; they compare that to the rate
charged by a shipper in another country which has not received such
subsidies, and then the price difference - the margin of undercutting
= can be the basis for the imposition of redress of duties. It was pri-
marily aimed at the Soviet Union, and at the nonmarket economies,
but the first case has been against Korea, and, in that case, redress of
duties has been imposed.
With respect to the second question about the EC shippers flying
foreign flags, I think that essentially a complaint could be brought
against those shippers, but it would have to be brought by a European
industry, and they may not find it in their interest, if they only engage
in that practice, to cut off their own head.
C. SPILLMAN:
I have a very easy question and this goes to Mr. Vermulst. We are
talking of the consumer advantages, and I hear and read that, in 1993,
consumer prices in the Common Market shall go down between ten
and thirty percent. In the transportation sector, they talk about thirty
percent price cuts. Am I the only one who hears that, or do you hear
that, or think that? If this is true, we will have even twice or three
times as many companies who go out of business immediately.
E. STEIN:
Mr. Donner is our last speaker. Mr. Donner is an official of the
Netherlands University of Justice and the son of the first President of
the European Court of Justice, whom we were able to welcome with us
yesterday.
J. DONNER:
I hope you won't hold against my father what I'm going to say. I
just want to draw attention to one aspect of the discussion here, that
the whole development towards 1992 is somewhat lopsided and con-
centrated on trade. Here I want to agree with others' remarks that
this fascination with the progress that has been made in the field of
goods is endangering the whole project by outdistancing the political
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acceptability and other aspects that are necessary for a consolidation
of the success. It has been asked, where are the consumers. Now it's
not only the consumers. Professor Frowein already indicated a grow-
ing resistance in a German Lnder to the developments within the
Community. I must say I'm working with the Dutch government.
The Dutch have traditionally been one of the most Community-
minded countries and still, there, there is a growing resistance in polit-
ical classes to a loss of control. With the Cassis de Dijon philosophy,
which is essential to the construction of the case, there is a growing
feeling of losing control over producers who can use the diversity
within the Community to their own profit, and to the detriment of
consumers and the labor force. There is another aspect as well. The
whole integration at the moment is product-led. The other, social as-
pect, the free movement of peoples, is completely left out of the Com-
munity development at the moment. It is not left out of the Single
European Act of 1986 but it does not fall under the majority rule. I
am personally involved in discussions over the framework of the
Shenger Agreement, which is a sort of precursor to the free movement
of persons throughout the Community. Free circulation of persons
has its own precursors. There you get into the real problems of the
next development of the Community: judicial cooperation, police co-
operation and how they can be controlled. Therefore, I would also
very much doubt whether the Single Act can be considered a constitu-
tional document, even though there were some advances made in for-
eign policy, especially with all the reservations concerning public
security and public interest which became significant as soon as they
started to deal with free circulation of persons. In another respect, I
think, that success is on clay feet as long as the Community does not
have the necessary instruments of power. At the moment, there is a
slow progression in proposals from the Commission for having direct
competence within the Member States and having the authority to
provide direct legal protection within the Member States. There, the
resistance is largest to the whole development, and I think that pro-
gress is going to be made. It will certainly not be made before 1993,
but the whole development will take place after 1993. Those are the
most significant indicators of a permanent success in the field because
otherwise it always has the risk of falling apart.
E. STEIN:
One comment on the last statement. Mr. Donner, who is on the
staff of the Netherlands Ministry of Justice, has raised the important
question of assuring the free movement of people, not only of workers,
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in the Community, in connection with the plan for a complete removal
of internal frontier controls as part of the Project 1992. This might
require extensive harmonization of national regulations in such mat-
ters as visas, police cooperation, checks on foreigners, asylum, hot
pursuit, etc. In fact, as he suggested, the Single European Act, which
introduces majority voting for harmonization of national legislation on
most subjects concerning the internal market, specifically excludes the
free movement of persons from this liberalization provision. Mr. Don-
ner also referred to the so-called Schengen agreement which was nego-
tiated by France, West Germany, and the Benelux countries. In that
agreement, the parties agreed to abolish all border controls between
them as a "precursor" - as Mr. Donner put it - to an all-Commu-
nity agreement, in other words, to blaze a trail that the other wary
Member States would follow. But I am told that there has been a last
minute hitch with the Schengen treaty.
I should like to conclude this lively discussion by raising four ques-
tions bearing upon the success of Europe 1992.
The first one concerns the legislative program. I am told that
forty-seven percent of the proposals that the Community was to enact
as part of the program have already been adopted, including such im-
portant texts as the provision for complete freedom of capital move-
ment. Now the question here is, first of all, how firm these provisions
are, how many derogation clauses, and reserved national safeguard
clauses there are which will be invoked, what postponements and spe-
cial arrangements will be made for instance for the newcomers Spain,
and Portugal or for Greece. Also, some of the most controversial pro-
posals, such as the drafts on indirect tax harmonization, final liberali-
zation of financial services and removal of all physical frontiers inside
the Community are still on the table. That is the first set of questions.
The second question concerns the implementation of those meas-
ures, principally in the form of "directives," that have already been
enacted by the Council. There has been a dramatic increase in cases
where the Commission has had to sue the Member States before the
Court of Justice because they failed to transform the directives into the
respective national legal orders within the established deadlines. As
the number and importance of the adopted directives increases - and
it is bound to do so - so will the problem of getting the national
parliaments and administrations to implement them and apply them
properly.
The third question is the one raised by Dr. Meng: to what extent
will the unavoidable adverse impact on jobs and on smaller business
hold back the progress toward creating a real home market?
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The fourth - and perhaps the most important - question relates
to the response of European business. Will the management be pre-
pared to plan on a global basis and modify the structures with a view
to meeting increased competition not only within Europe but also on a
worldwide level? We have already seen some substantial restructuring
particularly among French, British and Spanish enterprises (with
some considerable activities by the Japanese), but the verdict is not in
as yet on this issue.
One last comment. The faculty of the University of Michigan Law
School deliberated on how to grade this panel. After a lengthy consid-
eration it was decided, contrary to all established precedents, to grade
all the panel members A+. Thank you.
